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Abstract. The highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV), subtype H5N1 poses a serious threat not only to the poul-
try industry and wild birds but also to humans. Despite a large number of studies conducted on various aspects of this virus,
its transmissibility is still poorly understood. This study quantifies the basic reproductive number (R0) of the global HPAIV
H5N1 spread within domestic poultry during December 2003 to December 2009. Three different approaches were applied
to estimate R0 for HPAIV H5N1: (i) epidemic doubling time; (ii) spatial distance-based nearest neighbour; and (iii) spatio-
temporal distance-based nearest neighbour. These three approaches represent temporal (tR0), spatial (sR0) and spatio-tem-
poral transmissibility (stR0), respectively. The joint application of these three approaches provides a more complete profile
by characterising the transmissibility traits of infectious diseases from different perspectives. Estimates of tR0 gradually
decreased over the six sequential epidemic waves (EWs) examined, suggesting that the implemented control measures were
effective in reducing the number of outbreaks. However, sR0 and stR0 increased from EW1, peaked in EW3 and then grad-
ually decreased during EW4-EW6, reflecting different aspects of disease transmissibility compared to tR0. The application
of all three methods in the final EW6 showed R0 >1, suggesting that the control measures implemented did not completely
interrupt the transmission cycle, and hence were insufficient to eliminate HPAIV H5N1. Close monitoring of HPAIV H5N1
outbreaks and enhanced control policies is advised.
Keywords: avian influenza, H5N1, reproductive number, transmissibility, epidemiology, spatial analysis, spatio-temporal
analysis.
Introduction
The re-emergence and global spread of the highly
pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV), subtype
H5N1 since late 2003 has raised concern about an
impending influenza pandemic (White and Pagano,
2008). Although there is currently limited evidence of
efficient human-to-human transmission of HPAIV
H5N1, it would be possible for a new variant to
acquire the ability of sustained transmission among
humans if it re-assorts with a human virus in co-infect-
ed mammalian hosts (human or non-human) (Longini
et al., 2005). HPAIV H5N1 has been studied by
researchers from various fields, ranging from molecu-
lar studies at the micro-scale to spatial analysis at the
macro-scale (Li et al., 2004; Carrel et al., 2010; Zhang
et al., 2010), but the basic epidemiological character-
istics of this virus strain remains poorly understood,
especially regarding transmissibility within poultry
populations (Bouma et al., 2009; Penny et al., 2010).
A better understanding of the transmission dynamics
is paramount for assessing the efficacy of implement-
ed control measures and guiding the design of more
efficient control policies and surveillance programmes
going forward (Stegeman et al., 1999, 2004). 
The basic reproductive number (R0) is a key param-
eter for understanding disease transmissibility. It is
defined as the expected number of secondary cases
generated by an infectious case (which can be an indi-
vidual – a flock or a herd – a village or a region) dur-
ing its entire infectious period in a fully susceptible
population (Anderson and May, 1991; Mills et al.,
2004; Massad et al., 2007). If R0 >1, each infectious
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case infects >1 susceptible individuals and the epidem-
ic can thus propagate, but if R0 ≤1 the epidemic will
eventually fade out (Garske et al., 2007). Because
close contact with sick or dead poultry is a risk factor
with respect to human influenza caused by HPAIV
H5N1, controlling and preventing the spread of this
virus in poultry flocks should effectively reduce the
threat of a human HPAIV H5N1 influenza pandemic
(Zhou et al., 2009; Yupiana et al., 2010; Zhang et al.,
2010). Therefore, quantitatively estimating the R0 of
HPAIV H5N1 in domestic poultry, particularly as a
measure of the effectiveness of control, becomes
important (Ward et al., 2009). A few studies have
reported estimates of R0 for HPAIV H5N1: Bouma et
al. (2009) estimated R0 in chickens through controlled
experimental studies; Tiensin et al. (2007) used mor-
tality data from chicken flocks to estimate R0 in
Thailand; Soares Magalhães et al. (2010) estimated
and compared the within-flock R0 using routine sur-
veillance data in chicken and duck flocks before and
during the vaccination period in Vietnam; Penny et al.
(2010) investigated the transmissibility of HPAIV
H5N1 in wild water birds at Lake Constance in
Europe, and Ward et al. (2009) applied different meth-
ods to calculate the village-based R0 of HPAIV H5N1
in Romania. However, to our knowledge, the R0 of
HPAIV H5N1 at the global scale has not previously
been reported.
The aim of this study was to estimate and compare
the R0 of HPAIV H5N1 in domestic poultry at the
global scale from temporal, spatial and spatio-tempo-
ral perspectives based on a worldwide database of
reports from December 2003 to December 2009. This
work was done with the expectation that the results be
used to estimate the efficacy of currently implemented
control measures and provide guidance for the further
development of control policies. 
Materials and methods
Outbreaks of HPAIV H5N1 in domestic poultry
Reported outbreaks of HPAIV H5N1 in domestic
poultry were compiled by sub-district on a day-by-day
basis from the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO), the World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE) and other sources, covering the
period of December 2003 to December 2009.
Locations and dates were available for each reported
outbreak. Outbreak definition and the database have
been previously described (Zhang et al., 2010). Six
epidemic waves (EWs) were characterised based on an
analysis reported previously (Zhang et al., 2010).
Their associated number of outbreaks and proportion
were tabulated (Table 1).
Estimation of the reproductive number (R0)
R0 measured the overall transmissibility of HPAIV
H5N1 among the sub-districts in this study and was
defined as the average number of secondary sub-dis-
tricts (see below) that each (previous) infectious sub-
district infected during the entire period of infectious-
ness in an epidemic wave.
Approach of epidemic doubling time (tR0)
Assuming HPAIV H5N1 had an exponential epi-
demic phase and the doubling time of outbreak num-
bers was constant, tR0 could be approximated by the
formula 3 + *D 1vd + np4, where D is the infectious
duration of an epidemic (the value of 7 days was used
for D) (Ward et al., 2009; Iglesias et al., 2011); td the
time interval in which the number of outbreaks dou-
bles (the doubling time) (Anderson and May, 1991),
which were calculated using 10 different starting val-
ues (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17 and 19) and ln the nat-
ural log (e). For each starting value, all possible com-
binations of td were obtained from the ascending
(exponential) phase of each epidemic. The average td
was used as the doubling time for each starting value
to compute the tR0 (Ward et al., 2009). To check the
robustness of the results regarding the infectious peri-
od (D), we also analysed the case in which the infec-
tious duration was 14 days.
Spatially nearest neighbour method (sR0)
For each individual outbreak, we defined the closest
outbreak as its infection source, while “closeness” was
measured using the Euclidean distances among out-
breaks in a constrained circular space, where 5-50%
Epidemic
wave
Period Outbreaks Proportion (%)
1
2
3
4
5
6
10.12.2003-30.06.2004
01.06.2004-31.05.2005
01.06.2005-31.10.2006
01.11.2006-30.09.2007
01.10.2007-31.10.2008
01.11.2008-31.12.2009
2,540
1,927
2,338
657
682
283
30
23
28
8
8
3
Table 1. Description of epidemic waves used in this study.
Z. Zhang et al. - Geospatial Health 7(1), 2012, pp. 135-143 137
of the maximum distance (M) among outbreaks were
used as the circle radii using intervals of 5%, i.e.
5%M, 10%M, 15%M, 20%M, 25%M, 30%M,
35%M, 40%M, 45%M and 50%M, respectively. For
each specified space, the process of searching for the
spatially nearest neighbour was repeated for all out-
breaks, so each outbreak could be assigned a source,
excluding the earlier outbreak. The number of out-
breaks attributed to each source could be summarised
accordingly, and its mean value obtained as the sR0
(Ward et al., 2009).
Spatio-temporally nearest neighbour approach (stR0)
The method and procedures of calculating the stR0
were the same as those for sR0, except that the defini-
tion of “closeness” among outbreaks here was based
not only on the Euclidean distance, but also on the
time difference. The former was the same as sR0; the
latter required that the date of each studied outbreak
should be later than that of the closest outbreak (infec-
tion source) and their difference should be ≤7 days
(infectious duration). For the sensitivity analysis, the
value of 14 days was also used for the duration of
infectiousness to investigate the influence of different
infectious duration on the estimated stR0.
Associations between reproductive number (sR0 and
stR0) and poultry density
The global poultry density was obtained from FAO
via the Geonetwork (http://www.fao.org/geonet-
work/srv/en /main.home), which provided the values
of poultry densities per km2 (for methodology and
sources of the data estimates, see Robinson et al.,
2007). The poultry density of each outbreak was first
extracted based on the outbreak location, then
Spearman rank correlation analysis was used to
analyse the associations between the poultry density
and sR0 and stR0 (both 7 and 14 days were used for
infectious duration, respectively). No corrections
were made for multiple comparisons.
Results
Spatial distribution of global HPAIV H5N1 outbreaks
Fig. 1 displays the spatial distribution of the global
HPAIV H5N1 outbreaks in six sequential EWs. Out of
these, EW1 and EW2 were originally contained in East
and Southeast Asia. With regard to EW3, which had
the widest spatial distribution among all the EWs, the
outbreaks eventually spread to Europe and Africa,
Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of global HPAIV H5N1 outbreaks, categorized as six epidemic waves (EWs). The EW1 and EW2 were
originally contained in East and Southeast Asia; in EW3, outbreaks spread to Europe and Africa, which had the widest spatial dis-
tribution among all EWs; while in EW4-EW6, outbreaks were gradually mitigated, but the spatial distribution in EW6 was still
wider than EW1 and EW2.
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while fewer outbreaks were reported for EW4-EW6.
However, the spatial distribution in EW6 was still
broader than that in EW1 and EW2.
Estimation of tR0
Table 2 shows the results of tR0 calculated using epi-
demic double time with the assumption of infectious
duration being 7 days. The results from various start
values were only slightly different for each EW, while
the overall tendency when comparing different EWs
was a decrease of the estimated tR0 from EW1 to EW3
followed by values, which remained relatively stable at
approximately 1.25. The results of tR0 on the basis of
the 14-day infectious duration were similar to that of
tR0 for those with infectious duration of 7 days, except
that the values were slightly higher (Table 3). 
Estimation of sR0
The sR0 obtained from the spatially nearest neigh-
bour method is summarised in Table 4. The sR0 in
EW1 was slightly above the threshold value of 1 but
increased substantially in EW2, peaked in EW3 and
then decreased in the EW4-EW6 period. All sR0s from
EW2-EW6 were above 2.0.
Estimation of stR0
Table 5 shows stR0 with the assumption of the infec-
tious duration being 7 days. The general characteris-
tics of stR0 across EW1-EW6 were similar to those for
sR0, except that the values of stR0 were consistently
lower than those of sR0. The results of stR0, using 14
days for infectious duration, are summarised in Table
Epidemic
wave
Start value
Mean
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
1
2
3
4
5
6
2.21
2.39
1.35
1.37
1.37
1.44
1.97
1.44
1.32
1.49
1.29
1.26
2.39
1.51
1.29
1.24
1.22
1.27
1.88
1.33
1.22
1.29
1.23
1.22
1.88
1.54
1.26
1.26
1.22
1.19
1.97
1.27
1.19
1.23
1.21
1.17
1.97
1.20
1.14
1.24
1.20
1.16
1.81
1.24
1.17
1.32
1.20
1.14
2.21
1.37
1.21
1.26
1.19
1.13
1.97
1.31
1.22
1.26
1.21
1.12
2.03
1.46
1.24
1.30
1.24
1.21
Table 2. tR0 calculated using the approach of epidemic double time (infectious duration = 7 days).
Epidemic
wave
Start value
Mean
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
1
2
3
4
5
6
3.43
3.77
1.69
1.75
1.75
1.88
2.94
1.88
1.65
1.97
1.57
1.51
3.77
2.02
1.59
1.49
1.44
1.54
2.76
1.67
1.43
1.59
1.46
1.44
2.76
2.08
1.51
1.51
1.44
1.38
2.94
1.54
1.37
1.46
1.42
1.34
2.94
1.40
1.29
1.49
1.40
1.32
2.62
1.49
1.33
1.65
1.40
1.29
3.43
1.75
1.42
1.51
1.39
1.26
2.94
1.63
1.43
1.51
1.42
1.24
3.05
1.92
1.47
1.59
1.47
1.42
Table 3. tR0 calculated using the approach of epidemic double time (infectious duration = 14 days).
Epidemic
wave
Radius (km)
Mean
69.3 130.0 256.9 468.0 599.9 668.2 729.9 791.4 859.3 955.6
1
2
3
4
5
6
1.00
1.96
2.80
2.03
1.78
1.76
1.02
1.99
2.98
2.20
1.95
1.94
1.04
2.02
3.09
2.31
2.00
2.04
1.04
2.02
3.19
2.37
2.04
2.09
1.05
2.02
3.22
2.38
2.06
2.09
1.05
2.02
3.23
2.38
2.07
2.10
1.05
2.02
3.23
2.39
2.08
2.11
1.05
2.02
3.24
2.40
2.08
2.11
1.05
2.03
3.25
2.40
2.08
2.11
1.05
2.03
3.25
2.40
2.09
2.12
1.04
2.01
3.15
2.32
2.02
2.05
Table 4. Summaries of sR0 from spatially nearest neighbour method.
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6. They are similar to those shown in Table 5, but with
slightly higher values.
Relationships between sR0/stR0 and poultry density
All the correlation coefficients between sR0 and
poultry density and stR0 and poultry density were
between 0.028 and 0.203 (see Tables 7, 8 and 9). Some
associations were statistically significant if 0.05 was
set as the significance level (irrespective of multiple
comparisons), but the magnitude of the corresponding
correlation coefficient was small. No obvious and con-
sistent relationships could be found between sR0/stR0
and poultry density.
Discussion
R0 can be accurately quantified using transmission
experiments under controlled indoor conditions
(Bouma et al., 2009). However, R0 values estimated
under field conditions differ considerably from con-
trolled experiments, e.g. the numbers of animals with-
in herds or flocks, and the contact structure among
animals, cannot be replicated in controlled experi-
ments (van der Goot et al., 2003, 2005; Tiensin et al.,
2007). R0 estimated using actual field data has there-
fore more practical applicability for disease control.
This study is the first attempt to estimate and compare
the global transmissibility from sub-district to sub-dis-
trict of HPAIV H5N1 across a large number of EWs,
in this case stretching from December 2003 to
December 2009. Such estimates can assist in the design
of control programmes for future epidemics (Ward et
al., 2009).
Three different R0 values were estimated based on
the attributes of time (tR0), space (sR0) and space-time
(stR0). The results of tR0 from epidemic doubling time
showed that tR0 tended to decrease in magnitude over
successive EWs. This suggests that the implemented
control measures were effective in reducing transmissi-
bility when using a non-spatial perspective. However,
R0 in EW6 was >1 indicating that the control measures
were inadequate to interrupt the transmission cycle and
probably insufficient to end the epidemic (Stegeman et
al., 2004; Tiensin et al., 2007). The results of sR0 and
stR0, calculated using spatially and spatio-temporally
nearest neighbour approaches, respectively, showed
similar features and are consistent with the overall spa-
tial and spatio-temporal characteristics of the epidem-
ic, i.e. the global HPAIV H5N1 epidemic started in
EW1, peaked in EW3 and then gradually declined
(Zhang et al., 2010, 2012). Because stR0 showed a pat-
tern similar to sR0 (but not tR0), we can infer that spa-
tial transmissibility dominated non-spatial (temporal)
transmissibility. This is consistent with previous studies
that found that bird migration and transportation of
poultry and poultry products are two important risk
factors for the spread of HPAIV H5N1 (Gilbert et al.,
Epidemic
wave
Radius (km)
Mean
69.3 130.0 256.9 468.0 599.9 668.2 729.9 791.4 859.3 955.6
1
2
3
4
5
6
0.95
1.65
2.13
1.29
1.24
0.67
0.97
1.75
2.36
1.51
1.48
1.08
0.99
1.80
2.53
1.68
1.61
1.31
1.01
1.82
2.70
1.85
1.67
1.60
1.01
1.84
2.76
1.90
1.71
1.65
1.02
1.87
2.78
1.92
1.73
1.68
1.02
1.87
2.79
1.93
1.74
1.69
1.02
1.88
2.81
1.95
1.74
1.70
1.02
1.88
2.82
1.96
1.74
1.70
1.02
1.88
2.85
1.98
1.78
1.70
1.00
1.82
2.65
1.80
1.64
1.48
Table 5. Summaries of stR0 from spatio-temporally nearest neighbour method (infectious duration = 7 days).
Epidemic
wave
Radius (km)
Mean
69.3 130.0 256.9 468.0 599.9 668.2 729.9 791.4 859.3 955.6
1
2
3
4
5
6
0.96
1.80
2.41
1.55
1.48
1.01
0.98
1.85
2.62
1.80
1.68
1.40
1.01
1.89
2.76
1.94
1.76
1.69
1.02
1.90
2.87
2.14
1.83
1.85
1.03
1.92
2.91
2.19
1.86
1.87
1.03
1.94
2.92
2.21
1.87
1.87
1.03
1.95
2.94
2.23
1.89
1.89
1.03
1.95
2.95
2.24
1.89
1.89
1.03
1.95
2.97
2.25
1.90
1.90
1.03
1.96
2.99
2.29
1.91
1.90
1.01
1.91
2.83
2.08
1.81
1.73
Table 6. Summaries of stR0 from spatio-temporally nearest neighbour method (infectious duration = 14 days).
Z. Zhang et al. - Geospatial Health 7(1), 2012, pp. 135-143140
2006; Kilpatrick, 2006; Fang et al., 2008).
It is possible that sR0 and stR0 results were different
from tR0 because these metrics focus on different
aspects of disease transmissibility, suggesting that their
joint application can provide a more comprehensive
profile of disease transmissibility from the temporal,
spatial and spatio-temporal perspective. Previous stud-
ies only focused on one dimension of disease trans-
missibility, which could result in the loss of useful
information. It is well known that R0 is affected by
many factors, including epidemiological, demographic
and geographical features; density being perhaps the
most important influence of HPAIV H5N1 transmis-
sion, at least in domestic poultry (Keeling and Eames,
2005; Sharkey et al., 2008; Soares Magalhães et al.,
2010). We found that the magnitudes of correlation
coefficients between R0 and poultry density were all
very small. If all possible corrections to address the
problem of multiple comparisons, e.g., the Bonferroni
correction method (Dunn, 1961) are taken into
account, then, most of the results were non-signifi-
cant. Hence, poultry density did not significantly
affect the estimated R0 at the sub-district level in our
study. We inferred that other factors were unlikely to
have a significant impact on the estimated R0.
R0, as estimated in this study, can provide insights
regarding the potential risks for future influenza pan-
demics caused by HPAIV H5N1 variants if we compare
it with R0 from previous influenza pandemics based on
the assumption that HPAIV H5N1 has similar transmis-
EW
Radius (km)
69.3 130.0 256.9 468.0 599.9 668.2 729.9 791.4 859.3 955.6
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
0.032(0.112)
0.099(0.003)
0.113(0.003)
0.136(0.027)
0.129(0.021)
0.087(0.328)
0.033(0.110)
0.097(0.003)
0.077(0.040)
0.095(0.124)
0.084(0.136)
0.083(0.345)
0.030(0.147)
0.097(0.003)
0.055(0.144)
0.064(0.298)
0.072(0.199)
0.077(0.382)
0.030(0.144)
0.096(0.003)
0.030(0.431)
0.062(0.310)
0.049(0.385)
0.079(0.374)
0.030(0.143)
0.097(0.003)
0.028(0.454)
0.063(0.307)
0.041(0.461)
0.070(0.432)
0.031(0135)
0.097(0003)
0.029(0445)
0.063(0307)
0.035(0538)
0.068(0441)
0.031(0135)
0.098(0003)
0.026(0493)
0.063(0307)
0.033(0555)
0.066(0458)
0.031(0.134)
0.098(0.003)
0.026(0.491)
0.063(0.310)
0.033(0.553)
0.066(0.458)
0.031(0.133)
0.098(0.003)
0.027(0.475)
0.063(0.310)
0.032(0.567)
0.066(0.458)
0.031(0.133)
0.099(0.003)
0.026(0.492)
0.063(0.304)
0.032(0.566)
0.053(0.547)
Table 7. Correlations between poultry density and sR0 from spatially nearest neighbour method.
*correlation coefficient (P value).
EW
Radius (km)
69.3 130.0 256.9 468.0 599.9 668.2 729.9 791.4 859.3 955.6
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
0.072(0.0004)
0.116(0.0002)
0.182(<0.0004)
0.128(0.030)
0.041(0.444)
0.189(0.015)
0.067(0.0009)
0.095(0.003)
0.146(<0.0001)
0.118(0.046)
0.109(0.045)
0.151(0.072)
0.060(0.003)
0.080(0.012)
0.104(0.004)
0.125(0.038)
0.118(0.030)
0.174(0.037)
0.053(0.008)
0.082(0.011)
0.067(0.063)
0.114(0.060)
0.122(0.026)
0.161(0.058)
0.053(0.008)
0.079(0.014)
0.063(0.084)
0.131(0.030)
0.102(0.063)
0.161(0.059)
0.052(0.010)
0.080(0.012)
0.070(0.053)
0.130(0.032)
0.098(0.073)
0.174(0.041)
0.053(0.009)
0.080(0.012)
0.074(0.041)
0.138(0.023)
0.103(0.061)
0.167(0.050)
0.053(0.009)
0.082(0.010)
0.081(0.027)
0.131(0.031)
0.102(0.062)
0.169(0.047)
0.052(0.010)
0.082(0.010)
0.081(0.026)
0.127(0.037)
0.102(0.062)
0.169(0.047)
0.052(0.011)
0.079(0.014)
0.080(0.028)
0.126(0.038)
0.096(0.080)
0.170(0.046)
Table 8. Correlations between poultry density and stR0 from spatio-temporally nearest neighbour method (infectious duration = 7 days).
*correlation coefficient (P value).
EW
Radius (km)
69.3 130.0 256.9 468.0 599.9 668.2 729.9 791.4 859.3 955.6
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
0.056(0.006)
0.103(0.001)
0.157(<0.0001)
0.120(0.045)
0.134(0.014)
0.161(0049)
0.052(0.011)
0.099(0.002)
0.120(0.0001)
0.102(0.094)
0.189(0.0006)
0.145(0086)
0.04 1(0.042)
0.096(0.003)
0.081(0.027)
0.105(0.084)
0.189(0.0006)
0.196(0.022)
0.038(0.061)
0.090(0.005)
0.065(0.079)
0.107(0.082)
0.175(0.001)
0.197(0.024)
0.035(0.083)
0.089(0.006)
0.064(0.083)
0.110(0.073)
0.166(0.003)
0.203(0.019)
0.035(0.083)
0.088(0.006)
0.075(0.043)
0.107(0.081)
0.164(0.003)
0.203(0.019)
0.035(0.083)
0.088(0.006)
0.074(0.043)
0.115(0.060)
0.173(0.002)
0.192(0.027)
0.035(0.083)
0.090(0.005)
0.070(0.059)
0.112(0.067)
0.173(0.002)
0.192(0.027)
0.035(0.083)
0.090(0.005)
0.073(0.049)
0.113(0.065)
0.173(0.002)
0.192(0.027)
0.035(0.082)
0.082(0.011 )
0.070(0.059)
0.115(0.061)
0.173(0.002)
0.192(0.027)
Table 9. Correlations between poultry density and stR0 from spatio-temporally nearest neighbour method (infectious duration = 14 days).
*correlation coefficient (P value).
Z. Zhang et al. - Geospatial Health 7(1), 2012, pp. 135-143 141
sibility in poultry and humans. For the 1918-1919
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, the R0 estimates were
between 1.3 and 3.0, depending on different models and
model assumptions (Mills et al., 2004; Germann et al.,
2006; Massad et al., 2007; Chowell et al., 2008; Zhang
et al., 2010); R0 was estimated to be 1.68 for the 1957-
1958 influenza (H2N2) pandemic (Longini et al., 2004)
and 1.89 for that of 1968-1969 (H3N2) (Rvachev and
Longini, 1985). The fact that the R0 estimates for HPAIV
H5N1 in poultry, including our current estimates, were
located in the same range as those of previous influenza
pandemics suggests that HPAIV H5N1 constitutes a risk
for a potentially pandemic influenza in humans based on
transmissibility. However, more reasonable control
strategies can be designed based on our knowledge of R0
for the HPAIV H5N1 strain (Longini et al., 2005). The
vaccination strategy is considered to be one of the most
effective measures for controlling influenza, but it is
important to determine the critical proportion of suscep-
tible sub-districts that need to be immunised in order to
interrupt an epidemic. This target proportion can be
obtained using the formula 1-1/R0 (Anderson and May,
1991; Ferguson et al., 2005; Tiensin et al., 2007). Taking
the R0 in EW6 as an example, tR0, sR0, and stR0 were
1.26, 2.05 and 1.48, respectively. Thus, the minimum
vaccination coverage needed in the sub-district poultry
population would be 21%, 51% and 32%, respectively,
and the maximum value (51%) should be used as target
to completely bring the epidemic under control. It
should be acknowledged that vaccine efficacy is never
100% (van der Goot et al., 2005; Swayne et al., 2006;
Webster et al., 2006), so an extra amount of vaccination
coverage should always be added, e.g., 10% (van der
Goot et al., 2005; Savill et al., 2006; Tiensin et al.,
2007). 
Two issues must be stressed. The first of these
regards the assumption of the approaches used in this
study to estimate R0. It was supposed, according to tR0,
that the epidemic phase follows an exponential distri-
bution. With regard to sR0, the Euclidean distance-
based nearest neighbouring sub-district was presumed
to be the infection source for each outbreak of interest,
which assumes that spatial “closeness” is the strongest
factor influencing the spread of HPAIV H5N1. The
assumption of the stR0 method was that the Euclidean
distance-based nearest neighbouring sub-district within
the infectious duration window was the infection
source for each following outbreak of interest, which
assumed that proximity in both time and space is the
strongest factor driving the spread of the HPAIV H5N1
virus (Ward et al., 2009). The infectious duration is an
important parameter for estimating tR0 and stR0
(Ferguson et al., 2006; Chowell et al., 2007, 2008;
Andreasen et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2010), but accu-
rate estimates of the duration of infectiousness at the
sub-district level are unavailable (Garske et al., 2007)
so different researchers have assumed different values
(Mannelli et al., 2007; Tiensin et al., 2007). In this
study, we assumed that sub-district-based infectious
duration was 7 days, which remained constant during
the whole epidemic similar to the village-based study
conducted by Ward et al. (2009). To investigate the
robustness of the results, we also assumed a value of 14
days. Both values of tR0 and stR0 assuming a 14-day
infectious duration were slightly higher than those
assuming a 7-day infectious duration, but their results
were robust and use of either estimate arrive at the
same conclusions. The second issue is that the potential
underreporting and large numbers of asymptomatic
infections can result in an incomplete outbreak data-
base (Cauchemez et al., 2006; Chowell et al., 2007;
Glass et al., 2007), which may bias the results.
However, outbreaks in our study were re-defined as the
confirmed presence of HPAIV H5N1 (clinically
expressed or not) in at least one poultry flock in a spec-
ified sub-district during a certain period of time (Zhang
et al., 2010). In our study, this definition probably
reduced the impact of underreporting at the flock-level
to some extent. However, the magnitude of the influ-
ence due to underreporting cannot be evaluated, exact-
ly because the true numbers of outbreaks is an
unknown parameter.
Conclusion
The joint application of these R0 estimation methods
applied in this first study to quantify the R0 of HPAIV
H5N1 transmission within domestic poultry by sub-
district at the global level considering temporal, spatial
and spatio-temporal perspectives, provides a more
complete profile of the transmissibility of this virus.
The results indicate that currently implemented con-
trol measures are effective to reduce the number of
HPAIV H5N1 outbreaks, but not to prevent the spa-
tial spread of the infection. Since it is inadequate to
interrupt the transmission cycle, close monitoring of
HPAIV H5N1 and an enhanced control policy are
strongly needed. 
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